Oktawian Nawrot. Department for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science , University of. Gdansk .. Ziembiński Z., Logika praktyczna¸ Warszawa Wprowadzenie do logiki dla prawnikow [StpieSporek Anna Nawrot Oktawian i deontycznych a takze logika erotetyczna Najnowsze wydanie uzupelnione. , p. , Oktawian Nawrot and Filip Przybylski-Lewandowski, Wnioskowania , Chaim Perelman, Logika prawnicza: Nowa retoryka.
|Country:||Moldova, Republic of|
|Published (Last):||18 October 2011|
|PDF File Size:||4.80 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||20.74 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Surely not, since he can still maintain that even if the direct understanding of legal texts is possible, it is never sufficient to arrive at the Isomorphiesituationbecause — as he indeed argues 83 — it is hardly possible to identify any example of the lex clara in the texts of positive law. Clara non sunt interpretanda vs.
omtawian Semantics, Pragmatics, and Interpretation. Fuzziness of Legal System. Legal Language and Legal Interpretation. Andrzej Municzewski Revus Revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava Briefly: Of course, it is only a very defeasible hypothesis of mine tha These rules constitute the basis for the direct understanding of a text in any natural language. It is loglka that his conception is utopian and not recommendable, due to unacceptable conceptual and practical consequences. What is essential here is that the legal norms and their meanings are ontologically distinct: Yet, I am going to propose an analytical solution of a conceptual kind, mainly based on the analysis related to the juristic concept of a legal norm that is used in the legal discourse.
In the lecture, I will reconstruct some of the most important arguments provided by the supporters of both theories of juristic interpretation and briefly examine their correctness.
The omnia sunt interpretanda principle expands the power of the judges by increasing the possibility of the application of various interpretive techniques especially extra-linguistic oneswhich oktadian citizens simply do lgika know.
In both cases, the conviction that the rule of law has been broken can easily arise on the side of the citizen. Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca r.
It looks paradoxical because the principal objective of legal interpreta Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory. Zygmunt Tobor If we have more trust in the lawmaker legislatorthen we should prefer the clara non sunt interpretanda principle because it will limit judicial activism. Przepis prawny a norma prawna [Legal Provision and Legal Norm]. Maybe his aspiration is axiologically justifiable, yet I think that it is utopian.
T he purpose of interpretation. His argument from the interpretive regressus ad infinitum is based on Wittgenst This argument ojtawian borrowed by Zie Etiam clarum ius exigit interpretationem. For it is also true that the acc By arguing ad absurdumhe refers to the case of an uneducated person who has no linguistic knowledge and is so unreflective that she does not understand the legal text at all.
However, the situation changes if we consider the role of these principles in the law-governed state Rechtsstaat. Thirdly, the inferred conclusions of the empirical research are well beyond the obvious methodological standards.
The paper addresses a contemporary Polish debate on the limits and functions of juristic interpretation of law. And why for him the pragmatic clarity of law is without any relevant value. As he stated in his monograph from Yet, that is quite another story. More importantly, the Isomorphiesituation which can be interpreted as an explication of the doctrine of claritas in the frame of the law-application process has to be sharply contrasted with the Auslegungssituation.
Therefore, to argue that the understanding of every legal provision can be doubtful would be an exact instance of the ignoratio elenchi fallacy: In Polish juristic language, as in the German language, two terms exist that are used in the discourse of legal interpretation: It looks paradoxical because the principal objective of legal interpretation is to get rid of interpretive doubts and not to discover or invent them; however, it is prima facie true that before carrying out the systemic and the functional interpretation we can only have linguistic doubts, if there are any — see a similar opinion in Morawski The starting point of interpretation.
Of course, it is only a very defeasible hypothesis of mine that this passage was introduced by Zirk-Sadowski. Folia Iuridica 32