PDF | On Oct 1, , Sam Coleman and others published Consciousness and The Prospects of Physicalism. By Derk Pereboom. (New York: Oxford UP, Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Oct 1, , T. Alter and others published Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom. Review of Derk Pereboom Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. [ REVIEW]Tom McClelland – – Journal of Consciousness Studies
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In such a case, the introspective representational prispects are physjcalism illusory, and we are committed to an eliminativism with respect to phenomenal properties. No keywords specified fix it. Can such representations be understood in such a way as to be consistent with physicalism? Sign In or Create an Account. These arguments have resulted in a huge literature with a dialectic that has led to increasingly interesting and sophisticated positions on both sides of the issue.
So, as he sees it, Russellian monism assumes the following:. Derk Pereboom’s new book is the latest contribution to this literature, and it is much to be recommended to anyone who wants to keep abreast on these matters. You could not be signed in.
Russellian Monism in Philosophy of Mind. Consider introspective representations from the perspective of their ideal content. An absolutely intrinsic property is one that is intrinsic and does not reduce to parts having purely extrinsic properties.
They could be ‘phenomenal micro-psychist’ — essentially and irreducibly phenomenal — in which case we would have panpsychism. Panpsychism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. If one believes in phenomenal concepts, one could ask what the phenomenal concept that does the referring work from an introspective perspective refers to?
Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive? At present we don’t know which it is, of course, but that still means that an opening is left for physicalism.
Russellian monism starts off with a view of physical theory once advocated by Bertrand Russell  according to which it, at least in its present form, provides information about dispositional or extrinsic properties of its subject matter, but not about its categorical or intrinsic properties.
And protophenomenal properties, as well as phenomenal micro-psychist ones, are supposed to ground consciousness in a non-gappy way.
Chapters of the book are devoted to developing this idea and working out its implications. Pereboom offers no new insights on this, but he does acknowledge and briefly discuss the rather large literature on this in a lengthy footnote. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and it may be that these properties really lack such features.
Propsects there is a related question for which his answer is less satisfactory. In particular, some physicalists have lately been exploring new and out-of-the-mainstream ways of answering the anti-physicalist arguments. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: The second—to my mind far more sensible—view bears close relation to a Russellian neutral monism.
Request removal from index. Hill; Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism.
The qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis, if we can accept it, undermines some of the key premises in the various anti-physicalist arguments, and Pereboom devotes Chapters to showing in some detail how this is so and discussing some of the recent literature on all this.
Derk Pereboom – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 3: He points out that the ordinary content of an introspective representation can be naturalized in the standard way, but how this is supposed to solve the problem for the ideal content is never made clear. He doesn’t conclude that Russellian monism of either variety is true, but, as with the qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis, he regards it as an open possibility, and hence a possible position for the physicalist to adopt.
So one can have all such knowledge and be ignorant of the anf intrinsic properties that, on the Russellian view, underlie the dispositions and provide the substance as it were which constitutes the relata of the extrinsic properties. Prospetcs this to work, however, these so-called ‘phenomenal concepts’ cannot be mediated via a property that is only contingently related to the referent, else we could then question the physical status of this new property, and nothing would have been gained — or so it is argued.
Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out. No categories specified categorize this paper.
Qualia and Materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www.
Dimitris Platchias – – Analysis 73 4: Currently unknown or incompletely understood fundamental intrinsic properties provide the categorical bases for the known physical dispositional properties, and would also yield an account of consciousness.